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JURY AWARDS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
AND POST-VERDICT ADJUSTMENTS OF
THOSE AWARDS
Neil Vidmar, Felicia Gross, & Mary Rose*
The civil jury continues to be at the center of an ongoing debate
about a tort crisis and the need for "tort reform."1 While some of this
controversy involves charges that juries are biased or incompetent in
deciding liability2 and engage in extravagance and caprice in render-
ing punitive damages,3 equally important charges involve juries' com-
pensatory awards, particularly the general damages portion that many
scholars have tended to label exclusively as pain and suffering.4 While
little attention seems to be given to special, or economic, damages in
the debate, it is alleged that the "pain and suffering" component con-
* Neil Vidmar, Ph.D., is a Russell M. Robinson II Professor of Law at Duke Law School and
Professor of Psychology: Social and Health Sciences, Duke University. Felicia Gross is a J.D
student at Duke Law School. Mary Rose is completing her doctoral dissertation in the Depart-
ment of Psychology: Social and Health Sciences, Duke University. This research was supported
in part by a Eugene T. Bost Professorship of the Charles A. Cannon Charitable Trust No.3 held
by the first author during the Fall 1996 semester. The authors' conclusions do not necessarily
represent the views of the Trust.
1. See STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM
(1995); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE
MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS
(1995); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996);
Peter H. Schuck, Mapping The Debate in Jury Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM 306 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
2. For a general discussion of this debate, see VIDMAR, supra note 1.
3. DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 199; Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Histori-
cal Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1269, 1276 (1993).
4. W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 10 (1991); David Baldus et al., Improv-
ing Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/
Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV.
1109, 1141 (1995); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain
and Suffering Awards, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 912 (1989); Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Deter-
mine Pain and Suffering Award, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763,765 (1995); Steven P. Croley & Jon D.
Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1789 (1995); Marc Geistfield, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A
Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV.
775, 776 (1995); Edward T. McCaffery, Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and
Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341, 1344 (1995).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
stitutes the largest portion of awards,5 is not rationally defensible, and,
moreover, is highly variable and capricious from case to case. 6
Over the past two decades, a sizable number of studies have pro-
duced results that contradict the most extreme of the various claims
about civil juries. 7 This literature includes some studies bearing on
total awards and others attempting to separately isolate general dam-
ages.8 As will be discussed below, some of these studies are plagued
by methodological and conceptual problems while others are limited
in the extent to which the findings can be generalized. 9
Additionally, both commentaries and empirical studies have tended
to ignore the important question of whether plaintiffs receive the ac-
tual jury award or some other amount.' 0 A striking example of post-
verdict adjustment occurred in the now notorious McDonald's coffee
burn case." The jury awarded $160,000 in compensatory damages for
the severe burns suffered by the plaintiff and $2,700,000 in punitive
damages.' 2 The punitive component was reduced by the trial judge to
$480,000, resulting in a final judgment of just $640,000.13 Subse-
quently, the case was settled by the parties, presumably for a lesser
amount still. Little systematic research has been devoted to studying
the extent to which the reductions made in the McDonald's case may
be typical of other personal injury cases even though information
about the issue obviously has major implications for the jury
controversy.
This article is a first report of a larger study of jury awards and post-
verdict adjustments of those awards using data from three jurisdic-
tions: New York City and surrounding areas, Florida, and California.
5. PAUL WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 54 (1991); Croley & Hanson, supra note
4, at 1789; Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical
Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1397 (1989).
6. Viscusi, supra note 4, at 105; Baldus et al., supra note 4, at 1118; Bovbjerg et al., supra note
4, at 912; Chase, supra note 4, at 768; Geistfield, supra note 4, at 783.
7. Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L.
REV. 849 (1998).
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 75-90.
10. But see MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, PoST'RIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY
AWARDS vii (1987); Baldus et al., supra note 4, at 1168 (determining how awards are adjusted
when they fall outside the range of reasonableness); Ivy E. Broder, Characteristics of Million
Dollar Awards: Jury Verdicts and Final Disbursements, 113 JUST. Sys. J. 349, 353 (1986).
11. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV 93-02419, 1995 WL 360309
(D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994). For discussion of this case and additional references about it, see Sa-
muel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settle-
ment, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1996).
12. Liebeck, 1995 WL 360309, at *1.
13. Gross & Syverud, supra note 11, at 5.
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These jurisdictions were chosen because they require the jury to spec-
ify each element of damages in the verdict, thus allowing a direct as-
sessment of special and general damages. Our data were obtained
from commercial verdict reporters. Although these data sets present
a number of methodological problems, they overcome some of the
weaknesses in prior studies. Additionally, the verdict reporters pro-
vide information bearing on post-trial reductions and settlements that
allow us to study what happens to jury awards in the post-verdict
phase of the litigation process. We focus exclusively on medical mal-
practice cases for this article, although later studies will consider prod-
uct liability and automobile negligence cases.
In Part I, we review research literature bearing on jury awards for
compensatory damages with particular attention to general damages
in malpractice actions. 14 Part I also sets forth methodological and
conceptual criticisms of the prior research. 15 Part II reviews the
sparse research on post-trial adjustments of jury awards.16 Part III
explains the rationale of the present research and limitations of the
data.17 Part IV presents the results,18 and Part V discusses the impli-
cations of these results.' 9
I. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON COMPENSATORY AWARDS
A. Total Awards
Brian Ostrom and his co-authors at the National Center for State
Courts ("NCSC") conducted a study of jury awards that were ren-
dered in 1992 in a nationwide sample of fifty-two urban state courts.20
Plaintiffs prevailed in 30% of medical malpractice trials. 2' The me-
dian verdict, including punitive damages, in all tort cases was
$51,000.22 The mean award was much higher, $408,000.23 The dis-
crepancy between median and mean was produced by some very large
awards. When the top and bottom 5% of these outlier awards were
excluded, the mean was $160,000.24 Medical malpractice cases, how-
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part 11.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990's, 79
JUDICATURE 233 (1996).
21. Id. at 236.
22. Id. at 238.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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ever, had substantially higher awards.25 The median award was
$201,000 and the mean was $1,057,000.26 When outlier awards were
excluded, the mean was $432,000.27 Fully 15% of malpractice awards
exceeded $1 million.28 The malpractice win rates and awards in the
NCSC study are similar to those found in other studies. 29 There are
two important cautions in interpreting these data, however. First, the
discrepancy between tort awards overall and malpractice awards is
likely due, in large part, to differences in how malpractice cases are
selected for trial.30 Comparing across case types is comparing apples
and oranges. Second, while the data provide important information
about the overall magnitude of awards, they do not tell us anything
about the appropriateness-or inappropriateness-of awards.
A few studies attempted to compare jury awards against various
criteria that allowed a rough test of the claims that jury awards are
unrelated to plaintiff losses. Patricia Danzon studied a sample of in-
surers' claim files for California medical malpractice cases that were
closed during 1974 and 1976.31 Approximately 7% went to trial, and
plaintiffs prevailed 28% of the time.32 She compared the awards with
estimates of economic losses, injury, severity and age of the plaintiff.33
The analyses led her to conclude that, in general, jury awards were
related to the magnitude of plaintiffs' losses.34
Randall Bovbjerg and his co-authors analyzed a sample of 898 per-
sonal injury cases that had a median award of $82,000 and a mean of
$490,000 in 1987 dollars.35 The cases were also coded according to
seriousness of plaintiff injury according to the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") nine-point scale of physical in-
jury.36 Awards increased with level of injury severity, except when
death occurred; the amounts in death cases were substantially lower
than when plaintiffs suffered permanent major or grave injuries. 37 Se-
25. Id.
26. Ostrom et al., supra note 20, at 238.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 237.
29. VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 39.
30. See id. at 49; Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us
About Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFOLK U. L. REV. 1205, 1212 (1994).
31. PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
40-42 (1985).
32. Id. at 38.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 923.
36. Id.; see THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS: FINAL COMPILATION 48-66 (M. Sowka ed., 1980). The scale is discussed infra note 146.
37. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 923.
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verity of injury alone explained about two-fifths of the variation in
awards and other factors accounted for one-fifth.38 The authors spec-
ulated that most of the remaining variability might be due to jury
unreliability.39
W. Kip Viscusi also compared jury awards in a sample of product
liability cases against injury seriousness assessed by the NAIC scale. 40
He, too, concluded that awards were related to injury.41 However, he
also found that there was a lot of variability within levels of injury and
ascribed it to jury unreliability.42
Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin compared medical malpractice
and product liability verdicts in a large sample of cases from around
the nation and also found that awards were related to injury. 43 In
another study, Mark Taragin and his co-authors found that the pay-
ment to plaintiffs following a jury award was positively related to se-
verity of injury.44
The variability within levels of injury might be related to jury unre-
liability or bias in awarding damages as Bovbjerg and his co-authors
and Viscusi speculated, but there is a plausible alternative interpreta-
tion that might account for much of the variance. Frank Sloan and his
co-authors independently assessed the actual economic losses of a
sample of plaintiffs in Florida medical malpractice cases.45 Sloan and
his co-investigators found that within levels of injury, economic losses
varied substantially from patient to patient. 46 In hindsight, this find-
ing should surprise no one. The past and future economic losses of a
forty-year-old corporate executive would be much greater than the
losses of a seventy-year-old retired bricklayer, even if both suffered
equally debilitating injuries. Sloan and his co-authors' finding is only
indirect evidence bearing on a possible explanation of variability of
jury awards in the previous studies, but it is consistent with the alter-
native explanation of jury variability. If the individual juries heard
different evidence about the economic consequences of the injury,
then variability in their awards may have been only a response to that
evidence.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Viscusi, supra note 4, at 103.
41. Id. at 50-54.
42. Id. at 95-99.
43. DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 175.
44. Mark I. Taragin et al., The Difference of Standards of Care and Severity of Injury on the
Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 781 (1992).
45. FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 168 (1993).
46. Id.
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B. Studies of General Damage Awards Based on Jury Reports and
Closed Claim Files
The "pain and suffering" portion of jury awards has come in for
particular criticism in the jury debate. One committee of the Ameri-
can Medical Association, for example, asserted that pain and suffering
accounted for 80% of awards in excess of $100,000,47 and other au-
thors have claimed that it is in excess of 50% of awards. 48 Addition-
ally, it is often asserted that there is a great deal of variability in the
amounts that are given for "pain and suffering," and this has been
ascribed to jury incompetence or capriciousness. 49 Some research ap-
pears, on the surface, to be consistent with these claims.50
Before proceeding further, note that we have intentionally chosen
to use the term "general damages" as the label for the total compo-
nent of the compensatory award that is not special damages. As will
be clear from our discussion in Sections 1 and 2, pain and suffering is
only one element among others that are not special damages.51
Hence, we place quotation marks around the term when authors util-
ize pain and suffering as a generic term.
1. Prior Research
Danzon attempted to make estimates of "pain and suffering"
awards in a sample of medical malpractice cases from closed claim
data from Florida.52 These data were supplemented with data from
other jurisdictions. 53 She limited her analyses to "large" damage
award cases.54 She concluded that among plaintiffs who received
large awards, 51% received a "pain and suffering" component in ex-
cess of $100,000.55 There are many problems with her data and con-
clusions, including the facts that disparate data sources were
combined under questionable assumptions, there was a great deal of
missing data, and her estimates of economic losses were, by her own
admission, "unreliable. ' 56
47. Johnson et al., supra note 5, at 1369.
48. WEILER, supra note 5, at 55.
49. Viscusi, supra note 4, at 105; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 913.
50. See infra notes 52-74 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 52-90 and accompanying text.
52. Patricia M. Danzon, Florida Malpractice Awards for Pain & Suffering, in MEDICAL MAL-
PRAcrICE POLICY GUIDEBOOK 132 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1985).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 133.
56. A more detailed critique of the Danzon study is contained in Neil Vidmar, Empirical
Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Mal-
practice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 222 (1993).
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Viscusi similarly attempted to estimate the "pain and suffering"
component of jury awards in a sample of product liability cases ob-
tained from a survey of closed claim files conducted by the Insurance
Services Offices ("ISO").57 The ISO estimates of the plaintiff's eco-
nomic loss were used as the measure of economic loss and subtracted
from the total award to obtain an estimate of "pain and suffering. '58
Viscusi concluded that, while the "pain and suffering" component of
awards varied by type of loss and other factors, that component aver-
aged close to 70% of total jury awards.59
Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein conducted still another study in-
volving a sample of personal injury cases.60 Bovbjerg and his co-au-
thors disaggregated the cases according to severity of physical injury
as defined by the NAIC's nine-level scale. 61 These authors also used
estimates of economic loss and subtracted it from the total award to
estimate the pain and suffering component.62 However, the data set
involved a great deal of missing information on economic or special
damages.63 Bovbjerg and his co-authors found that the estimates of
the "pain and suffering" component increased with injury severity, ex-
cept that when death occurred, the average amount of non-economic
damages decreased sharply.64 Although concluding that, at the gross
level, "pain and suffering" awards appeared consistent with severity of
injury, Bovbjerg and his co-authors observed that there was great vari-
ability within levels of severity.65 While acknowledging that the varia-
bility could be a result of actual degree of plaintiff suffering reflected
in the evidence produced at trial, Bovbjerg and his co-authors offered
the conclusion that jury awards for "pain and suffering" were proba-
bly unreliable.66
Frank Sloan and his co-authors conducted a study of medical mal-
practice cases from a sample of birth injury and emergency room in-
jury closed claims that occurred in Florida in the 1980s. 67 Thirty-seven
57. Viscusi, supra note 4, at 43.
58. Id. at 104.
59. Id. at 102-09.
60. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 919.
61. Id; see infra pp. 273-75 (describing and critiquing the NAIC scale).
62. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 919.
63. The initial sample involved 898 cases, but the estimates of pain and suffering in awards
was based on 368 cases, an attrition rate of 59%. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 923-24.
These problems are discussed in Vidmar, supra note 30, at 1218-20.
64. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 932-36.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 24.
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of the cases were decided by juries.68 Like the other studies just de-
scribed, Sloan and his co-authors estimated the general damage com-
ponent by subtracting economic loss from the total award.69
However, unlike the other studies, which relied upon estimates of eco-
nomic damages collected by others, Sloan and his co-authors con-
ducted detailed interviews with plaintiffs and reviewed medical
records and other data for each case. 70 As discussed above, an impor-
tant finding from the study was that economic losses of plaintiffs va-
ried greatly within severity of injury categories. 71 From these data,
Sloan and his co-authors concluded that, on average, the amount that
plaintiffs received above their economic losses following a jury award
constituted only 22% of the total payment.72 It is essential to note
that Sloan and his co-authors' data involved estimates of what the
plaintiff actually received after judgment rather than the actual jury
verdict, 73 a point that we will return to in Part 11. 74
2. Methodological and Conceptual Problems
There are a number of methodological and conceptual problems
with the above studies that raise serious questions about the conclu-
sions that the authors drew from them. One methodological problem
involved the high incidence of missing data. The Danzon research had
to combine disparate data sources to achieve a sufficient sample size,
but in the end many data points were missing.75 This was also true of
the Viscusi data.76 The Bovbjerg study had an attrition rate of almost
two-thirds, and the final results of this much-reduced sample showed
inconsistencies that are hard to explain logically.77
A second methodological problem results from attempting to esti-
mate the general damages component by subtracting the special dam-
ages from the total. Vidmar referred to this as the "unreliable
subtrahend" problem due to the fact that estimates of special damages
may be biased or subject to considerable variability. 78 The clerks who
gather the data for commercial verdict reporters sometimes get their
68. Id. at 195.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 17.
71. Id. at 24.
72. Id. at 220.
73. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 220.
74. See infra Part II.
75. Vidmar, supra note 30, at 1225-34.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1223.
78. Id. at 1224.
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estimates of special damages from the plaintiff lawyer only or from
the defendant lawyer only while, for other cases, they may get them
from both sides and average any differences. Plaintiff lawyers are
prone to overestimate special damages while defense lawyers will un-
derestimate them. If only one source for the data is used, the subtra-
hend will be larger or smaller than it should be. If the plaintiff is the
source of the estimate for one case, the defendant for another, and if
both sides are averaged for a third, there will be differences in the
subtrahend that are method variance rather than jury variance. In the
Viscusi study, the estimate of specials, or non-economic components,
were all from a defense perspective, raising concerns, about an under-
estimate of plaintiff losses and a consequent overestimate of general
damages. These problems were absent from the Sloan study, but, as
mentioned, its sample size was quite small and the data involved the
payment received by the plaintiff rather than the jury award.
Further issues make it difficult to attribute variability of awards to
jury unreliability. The verdict reports tell us nothing at all about what
the jury heard in testimony. A related problem arises from use of the
NAIC scale, which codes injury seriousness solely according to physi-
cal injury. In medical malpractice cases, for example, a sexual assault
by a doctor could result in severe mental anguish, emotional distress,
anxiety, and loss of consortium by the plaintiff's spouse. Negligent
administration of a drug that made the patient permanently psychotic
would also be a severe trauma. Similarly, a wrongful birth case does
not involve permanent physical trauma. Under the NAIC scale, these
harms would probably be classified as minor since there is no demon-
strable physical injury.
While the validity of the NAIC scale classification system is serious
enough, there is an even more important problem associated with
drawing inferences of similar pain and suffering from physical injury
alone because no consideration is given to either the actual degree of
pain and mental trauma, or the past and future duration of that pain.
One person who has a limb amputated will experience severe phan-
tom pain whereas another will experience little or no such pain. A
twelve-year-old amputee with severe phantom pain can be actuarially
expected to endure sixty or more years of that pain whereas a seventy-
two-year-old can be expected to endure a briefer period. In short,
drawing inferences about seriousness of pain and suffering from de-
gree of physical injury alone can be very misleading. But the jury
hears directly about those sentient states and their expected duration.
The variability in awards within categories of injury could be due in
whole, or in part, to the evidence at trial.
1998]
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The final problem is conceptual, namely labeling all general dam-
ages as "pain and suffering." Pain and suffering is defined as compen-
sation for physical pain.79 General damages may include such
elements as disfigurement, loss of parental guidance, loss of parental
companionship, loss of moral training, loss of consortium, emotional
distress, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and human dam-
ages.80 While some of these elements may entail the psychological
equivalent of pain and suffering, others may have arguable economic
components. For example, in response to a vignette involving a
woman whose face was severely disfigured, but who returned to work,
jurors considered the potential impact of the disfigurement on her
chances for job advancement and on the stability of her marriage.8'
With regard to the marriage issue, jurors interviewed after an actual
jury trial involving a woman who suffered moderate brain damage
frankly discussed the potential consequences for her current marriage
and the fact that divorced women often suffer substantial drops in in-
come.82 In pattern instructions the jurors are cautioned that they
should not award compensation for disfigurement when economic ele-
ments are given in some other item in the damages, 83 but the instruc-
tion appears to give juries discretion in determining economic
components. Similar discretion appears to be granted with respect to
mental anguish,84 anxiety relating to future disease,85 loss of consor-
tium, 86 and loss of parental guidance and consortium. 87 There are, of
course, normative issues associated with all aspects of general com-
pensatory damages, but the important point to be made is that the
label "pain and suffering" as a synonym for general damages greatly
oversimplifies the complex human judgments that case law and statu-
tory law asks juries to make.
Despite these sources of error, which potentially add a great degree
of methodological variability, the studies do allow a rough conclusion
that both overall awards and their general damages components ap-
pear to be related to seriousness of injury and economic loss. 88 This is
79. RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS 321 (3d ed.
1993).
80. Id. at 264-402.
81. Neil Vidmar et al., Damage Awards and Jurors' Responsibility Ascriptions in Medical Ver-
sus Automobile Negligence Cases, 12 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 149, 154 (1994).
82. See VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 241.
83. EADES, supra note 79, at 328.
84. Id. at 342.
85. Id. at 346.
86. Id. at 330.
87. Id. at 66-67.
88. Viscus,, supra note 4, at 214-15; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 913.
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because the relationship appears in so many studies. However, the
issue of size of the general damages component and variability within
category of seriousness may be explained by factors other than inter-
jury variability. 89 Only Sloan and his co-authors' study is methodolog-
ically adequate, and it shows that variability of economic loss may ex-
plain much jury verdict variability. 90 The primary difficulty with the
Sloan study is its small and unrepresentative sample of cases. In short,
we have very little reliable information about what percentage of jury
awards are for general damages, let alone the pain and suffering
component.
C. Studies of Pain and Suffering Involving Controlled Experiments
Experimental research has studied the elements of pain and suffer-
ing and disfigurement but not other components of general damages.
Vidmar and his co-authors conducted a number of experiments in-
volving jurors awaiting jury duty.91 Two of the studies also compared
juror decisions with those rendered by senior lawyers. 92 In the first
experiment, Vidmar and Jeffrey Rice provided two samples of jury-
eligible laypersons and a sample of lawyers with a detailed description
of a patient who suffered a severe burn and disfiguring scar on her
knee during a surgical procedure. 93 The doctor's liability was not con-
tested, and the economic damages were stipulated. 94 Both jurors and
lawyers were asked to assess a damage award for pain and suffering
and for disfigurement. 95 The study found that while individual jurors
showed more variability in awards than the lawyers, the mean, or av-
erage, award was not significantly different between the laypersons
and professionals. 96 Furthermore, if twelve, or even six, jurors had
combined their estimates of awards, as would be the case for a jury, it
is probable that the damage awards would have been more stable, on
average, than if the case was decided by a judge in a bench trial. 97 The
study further uncovered the fact that the reasoning processes of
laypersons and professionals in rendering the awards was not basically
89. See Vidmar, supra note 30, at 1231-34.
90. See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 145-47.
91. Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical
Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883 (1993).
92. Id. at 891.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 892.
96. Id. at 896.
97. Vidmar & Rice, supra note 91, at 897.
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different. 98 A subsequent experiment by Neil Vidmar and David Lan-
dau, involving a more serious malpractice injury and with new groups
of laypersons and legal professionals, replicated the basic findings of
the first experiment. 99
In another experiment involving jurors only, the cause of an injury
was ascribed to either medical negligence or to automobile driving
negligence. 10 0 Additionally, for each type of injury there was a single
defendant, two defendants or a corporate defendant. 10 1 Neither the
cause of the injury nor the number or type of defendants had an effect
on the pain and suffering award. 102 In a fourth experiment, Vidmar
and his co-authors varied the possible contributory responsibility of
the plaintiff because some of the previous experiments suggested that
this might play a role in awards. 10 3 The results offered support for this
hypothesis.'04
Roselle Wissler and her co-authors conducted two jury simulation
experiments with psychology students that involved a series of per-
sonal injury cases.' 05 The seriousness of the plaintiff's injury was re-
lated to perceptions of the amount of harm suffered and to the
amount of the award for pain and suffering. 1°6 In both experiments,
the degree of the plaintiffs' perceived disability and mental suffering
were stronger predictors of awards than pain and disfigurement. 10 7
In another set of experiments in the same research program, Allen
Hart and his co-authors distinguished injuries resulting from unusual
circumstances from those that are commonly held beliefs about the
typical causes of injuries.108 Pain and suffering awards were larger
and more variable when the injury was caused by unusual
circumstances. 109
A further study by Michael Saks and his co-authors compared
methods of providing guidance on pain and suffering awards to simu-
98. Id. at 896.
99. The Vidmar and Landau experiment is reported in VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 221-35.
100. Vidmar, supra note 56, at 241.
101. Id. at 242.
102. Id. at 255.
103. Vidmar et al., supra note 81, at 151-52.
104. Id. at 157-59.
105. Roselle L. Wissler et al., Explaining "Pain and Suffering" Awards: The Role of Injury
Characteristics and Fault Attributions, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 181, 186 (1997).
106. Id. at 186-87.
107. Id. at 187.
108. Allen J. Hart et al., Injuries, Prior Beliefs and Damage Awards, 15 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 63,
64-65 (1997).
109. Id. at 72.
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lating jurors. 110 Four conditions involved giving jurors information
about average past awards, information about intervals of past
awards, a combination of averages and intervals, and/or a cluster of
examples of past awards."' The experiment also had a "no-guidance"
control condition and a condition involving a cap on awards."12 Saks
and his co-authors found that all of the jury guidance conditions re-
duced variability of awards in comparison to the control conditions.1 3
Controlled laboratory experiments are subject to problems of
generalizability or external validity because the participants may con-
sist primarily of college students, the cases involve short summaries of
evidence, and mock jurors may not feel the same responsibility as ju-
rors in a real case. 4 Nevertheless, these experiments provide insights
about the dynamics of juror decision processes. They suggest that
legal training and experience is not necessarily superior to the consen-
sus of twelve laypersons. In fact, lawyers and laypersons appear to
reason about pain and suffering in similar ways. The studies also sug-
gest that extra-legal factors do not have the impact that they are al-
leged to have on the size or variability of juror awards.
The central issue with simulation research is the problem of its arti-
ficiality, and the consequent limitations on confidence in our ability to
generalize to real world juries. In particular, it cannot address the in-
cidence and magnitude of actual jury awards that have charged the
tort reform debate.
D. Juror Interviews
Another approach to attempting to understand how jurors make
decisions on awards is through interviews with jurors. Valerie Hans
conducted a study of jurors who decided cases involving corporate de-
110. Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
243, 246 (1997).
111. Id. at 247.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 253-55.
114. Several other research studies provide data that is consistent with these studies although
the authors did not specifically isolate the pain and suffering component of awards. See Brian H.
Bornstein & Michelle Rajki, Extra-Legal Factors and Product Liability: The Influence of Mock
Jurors' Demographic Characteristics and Intuitions about the Cause of an Injury, 12 BEHAV. SCi.
& L. 127 (1994); Corinne Cather et al., Plaintiff Injury and Defendant Reprehensibility: Implica-
tions for Compensatory and Punitive Awards, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189 (1996); Neal Feigen-
son et al., Effect of Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on Attributions of Responsibility and
Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 597 (1997); Valerie
P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1989).
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fendants or doctors in medical malpractice cases. 115 Consistent with
the experimental studies described above, Hans found that, on the
whole, many jurors were highly suspicious of plaintiffs' motives for
making claims, and they were concerned that injured plaintiffs who
prevailed on liability did not get more than they deserved. 116 On is-
sues of matters of loss of consortium, for example, jurors applied stan-
dards of proof that appeared much more strict than those provided in
law.117 Vidmar found comparable attitudes in interviews with jurors
who had decided medical malpractice cases. 118
II. POST-TRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY AWARDS
As discussed in the introduction to this article, most of the debate
on the magnitude of jury awards has not taken cognizance of the fact
that jury awards may be altered by a number of processes in the post-
verdict phase of the trial. Jury verdicts are subject to review by the
trial judge who can alter the award through additur or remittitur or
order a new trial. The jury decision on the total amount of damages
suffered by the plaintiff may be reduced by a finding of comparative
negligence."a 9 The verdict may be appealed and adjusted by a higher
court. Finally, the litigating parties may agree to settle for a different
amount than the award, either following the verdict but before the
judgment or following judgment. There may be a number of reasons
for settling. The amount of the award may be greater than insurer
liability limits or the resources of the defendant. There is a risk that
the verdict could be overturned on appeal. A discounted award may
be preferable to an extended delay in payment while the case makes
its way through the appeal process. Finally, interviews conducted with
lawyers in conjunction with the research reported below indicated that
sometimes parties to litigation enter into a pre-trial "high-low agree-
ment" as a hedge against the uncertainty of jury trial.' 20 While they
115. See Valerie P. Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business Litigation, 79 JUDI-
CATURE 242, 244 1996), for a review and discussion of these studies [hereinafter Hans, The Con-
tested Role]. See Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate
Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 340-43 (1999).
116. Hans, The Contested Role, supra note 115, at 244.
117. Vidmar & Rice, supra note 91, at 899 (citing Valerie P. Hans & Michelle Hallerdin, Juror
Skepticism Towards Plaintiffs: The Example of Loss of Consortium Claims, Address at the Bian-
nual Meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society (Mar. 1992)).
118. See VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 265.
119. In fact, empirical studies of jury awards have not tended to make clear whether the data
reported involved the verdict on total damages suffered or the award adjusted for plaintiff negli-
gence, if any.
120. Anonymous interviews conducted by Neil Vidmar and Felicia Gross (1997-98 and 1998-
99 academic years).
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cannot settle the case because of disagreement about liability, amount
of damages or both, the plaintiff wants to avoid a total loss and the
defendant wants to avoid exposure to a very large award. In conse-
quence, the parties agree in advance that the defendant will pay a cer-
tain amount even if the plaintiff loses on liability, but in return the
defendant will not pay more than a certain amount even if the verdict
exceeds that amount.
Despite the fact that these post-trial adjustments may have major
consequences for the way that we look at the impact of jury awards,
only three studies have attempted to examine them. Ostrom and his
co-authors examined 744 tort trials. 121 Plaintiffs won 416 cases, or
56%.122 Fifteen percent of the cases involved bench trials. 123 A mo-
tion challenging the verdict was filed by the defendant in 136 of the
cases in which plaintiffs prevailed, but only eleven of the appeals were
successful. 124 Sixty-seven cases agreed to settle; of these, fifty-seven
involved no motions of appeal, and ten settled following an unsuccess-
ful appeal. 125 No appeal was filed in 271 cases, or 65%.126 A notice of
appeal was filed in the remaining sixty-seven cases, but no data was
available as to the final outcome of the case. 127 The total amount
awarded was positively related to the decision to appeal. 128 Jury trials
and cases involving awards of punitive or pain and suffering damages
were more likely to be appealed than when these characteristics were
absent. 129 However, Ostrom and his co-authors' study provided no
information on the actual amounts of awards, judgments or
settlements.
Ivy Broder reviewed a sample of 198 jury awards of $1 million or
more that occurred between 1984 and 1985.130 Plaintiffs received the
original jury award in just slightly more than a quarter of the cases.131
On average, the final aggregate disbursement to plaintiffs was 57%
lower than the original verdict. 132 The amount of the reduction varied
121. Brian Ostrom et al., So the Verdict is In-What Happens Next?, 16 JUST. Sys. J. 97 (1993).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Ostrom et al., supra note 121, at 97.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Ivy E. Broder, Characteristics of Million Dollar Awards: Jury Verdicts and Final Disburse-
ments, 11 JUST. SYs. J. 349, 350 (1986).
131. Id. at 353.
132. Id.
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by case type. 133 Medical malpractice awards, for example, were re-
duced by 27% on average.134 However, the average statistic obscures
the fact that larger awards were reduced more than smaller awards.
Broder's report did not indicate whether the reduction was made by
the trial judge or an appeal court or whether it resulted from post-
verdict settlements or inability to collect from the defendant.
Michael Shanley and Mark Peterson examined a sample of 161 ver-
dicts from Cook County, Illinois and San Francisco that were returned
during 1982 and 1984.135 Of this number, forty-one cases resulted in
plaintiffs prevailing at trial, a win rate of 25%.136 The authors con-
cluded that the actual payout of the awards was reduced in a signifi-
cant number of cases.1 37 A paucity of methodological details and data
in the report prevents closer scrutiny of their data.
In short, there is very little information on how frequently verdicts
are adjusted upward or downward or on the degree to which they are
adjusted in the post-verdict stages of litigation. While Broder's study
speaks to very large awards, more information is needed about what
occurs for all levels of cases.
III. A STUDY OF AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES IN
THREE JURISDICTIONS
We began the present research with the insight that some jurisdic-
tions require the jury to specify the damages for each element of the
damage award. Having data on jury verdicts of this type would allow
researchers to avoid the problems of estimating pain and suffering
awards; data on both economic and non-economic awards could be
summed and compared for each verdict to allow a direct assessment of
what proportion of awards juries give for general damages. We turned
to the states of New York, Florida, and California. Each state re-
quires juries to render special verdicts that separate economic from
non-economic damages. Moreover, for each state there are verdict
reports that provide data on these awards, plus some other details
such as the nature of the injury suffered by the plaintiff and the plain-
tiff's age. The injury data allow the same rough comparisons of
awards with seriousness of injury that other researchers have used.
However, in our analyses we collapsed the first four categories of the
133. Id.
134. Id. at 355.
135. MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, POSTTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY
AWARDS 13 (1987).
136. Id. at 27.
137. Id. at 47.
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scale because of the insensitivity of the scale to psychological traumas
and because the number of cases in these categories was small. The
reports also provide data on adjustments for findings of comparative
negligence, judicial additur and remittitur, and settlements following
verdicts that provide important insights about the differences between
verdicts and the amount actually obtained by the plaintiff.
Our goal in this research is to provide a descriptive map of what
samples of juries actually award for economic and non-economic dam-
ages and what occurs in the immediate post-verdict phase of the trial.
As we will detail below, our close scrutiny of the data sets revealed
problems that place some limits on the generalizability of our findings.
The data sets are not comprehensive of all cases, and there is evidence
that the selection may not be random. Moreover, reporting was often
incomplete, resulting in substantial attrition in the samples. Addition-
ally, we cannot stress too strongly the fact that our data do not pro-
vide any criteria for assessing whether the jury decisions were right or
wrong. However, even with these limitations our data provide useful
new information bearing on the civil jury controversy.
This article will focus exclusively on medical malpractice trials in
New York City and its surrounding counties, plus similar trials in
Florida and California. We will describe the data set and our findings
separately for each of these jurisdictions, treating them as independ-
ent studies, but we look for similarities and differences in trends.
Each of these jurisdictions has different laws, and it is likely that they
have different litigation patterns and legal cultures. Moreover, there
are probable differences in the representativeness of the verdict re-
ports and the methodologies by which the data were gathered for each
state. However, for each set of analyses, we maintained a uniform
conceptual distinction between special and general damage awards
and used the following decision rule: if there was any doubt as to
whether the element was one or the other, we labeled it as general
damages. This raises the possibility that the general damages compo-
nent in the data set is inflated, but we decided to err in that direction.
IV. DATA AND RESULTS
A. New York City and Surrounding Counties
New York law requires itemized verdicts in medical, dental, or
podiatric malpractice actions.138 We focus solely on medical
malpractice.
138. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4111(d) (McKinney Supp. 1998).
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1. The Sample
The New York data were obtained from the New York Jury Verdict
Reporter, published by Russell F. Moran, a monthly publication that
claims to report approximately 90% of all personal injury verdicts in
Metropolitan New York and surrounding counties.139 Documented
submissions by attorneys are the prime source for the reported data.
For this study, we collected all reported medical malpractice verdicts
from 1985 through 1997 that occurred in the trial divisions of the New
York Supreme Court in New York (Manhattan), Kings (Brooklyn),
Bronx, Queens, Richmond (Staten Island), Nassau, Suffolk, and West-
chester counties. The Reporter describes individual elements of the
jury verdict as well as other details about the case.
There were 705 cases. Plaintiffs won 366 of these cases, a win rate
of 52%. This win rate is higher than the nationwide average of around
30%.140 However, the higher rate does not allow us to conclude that
New York juries are more favorable to plaintiffs in comparison to
elsewhere since an equally plausible explanation is that the litigation
patterns by which cases are selected for trial may explain differences
in win rates.141
For purposes of our analyses, the initial sample of 366 cases suffered
attrition from various causes. No award was reported for sixteen
cases. Additionally, fifty-three cases reported a general damages
award that was equal to the reported total award. 142 Despite the fact
that one of the Reporter's editors said the full verdict was always re-
ported,143 a number of New York judges and lawyers that we inter-
viewed said with high confidence that such verdicts would be
anomalous. We did find a few cases where the Reporter stated that
economic, or special, damages were stipulated (amounts were not
given). Other cases were reported without such explanations. It is
our judgment that the reported verdict in most of these cases was the
total award, wrongly reported as being 100% general damages. Con-
sequently, we treated these cases as undifferentiated and removed
them from the data set. Another thirteen cases reported only a spe-
cials award. However, in contrast to the other cases, the Reporter pro-
vided details that gave us confidence that this was the actual verdict,
139. See Chase, supra note 4, at 782 for discussion of an interview with Editor Russell F.
Moran on August 3, 1993.
140. See VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 39; Ostrom et al., supra note 20, at 235.
141. See Vidmar, supra note 30, at 1217.
142. Four cases resulted in punitive damages, but this component of the award was removed
for our analyses.
143. Telephone interview conducted by Felicia Gross with Lynda Moran (Dec. 14, 1995).
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so these cases were retained for the analyses. There were four cases
which we decided had untrustworthy data because the sum of the spe-
cial and general damages differed from the overall award by more
than 5%. Thus, the working sample for total awards and post-trial
adjustments was 293 cases, but the data set comparing specials with
general damage components of awards was 252 cases. All awards
were adjusted to 1995 consumer price index dollars.144 Four awards in
the sample involved wrongful death claims for which punitive dam-
ages were given. This component was not counted as part of the
amount of the compensatory award.
Elements of the damage award varied considerably from case to
case. We followed a strict categorizing scheme after Professor Dan
Dobbs' text in determining which parts of awards were specials and
which were general, including derivative awards.145 For instance,
spousal "loss of services" was categorized as a specials component, but
"loss of consortium" was categorized as a general damages compo-
nent. Decisions were primarily determined by the second author
(Gross) of this article and scrutinized by the third author (Rose). In-
stances of continuing disagreement were resolved in discussions with
the first author (Vidmar).
The severity of the plaintiff injury claim was categorized using the
NAIC scale. 146 The second author made those ratings. Then a sub-
sample of 126 cases was rated by another person. The inter-rater reli-
ability of coding was calculated by a "weighted kappa" statistic and
yielded a value of .82; 14 7 this value demonstrates a high degree of reli-
ability of the ratings. The NAIC scale is widely used in estimating
severity of injuries, but, as described above, we found it to be poten-
tially misleading with respect to injuries classified as minor because its
orientation to physical injury ignores severe psychological trauma.
144. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1996, at 481 (1996).
145. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION 220-38 (1993).
146. NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS 8 (1975). The scale's nine categories are as follows:
(1) Emotional damage only (fright; no physical damage); (2) Temporary insignificant (lacera-
tions, contusions, minor scars, rash; no delay); (3) Temporary minor (infections, misset fracture,
fall in hospital; recovery delayed); (4) Temporary major (bums, surgical material left, drug side-
effect brain damage; recovery delayed); (5) Permanent minor (loss of fingers, loss or damage to
organs, includes non-disabling injuries); (6) Permanent significant (deafness, loss of limb, loss of
eye, loss of one kidney or lung); (7) Permanent major (paraplegia, blindness, loss of two limbs,
brain damage); (8) Permanent grave (quadriplegia, severe brain damage, lifelong care, or fatal
prognosis); (9) Death. Id.
147. See Jacob Cohen, Weighted Kappa: Nominal Scale Agreement with Provision for Scaled
Disagreement or Partial Credit, 70 PSYCHOL. BULL. 213 (1968).
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2. Jury Verdicts, Judgments and Settlements
Table 1 reports the mean and median awards and ranges for the
total sample of cases and also the same data disaggregated by the
NAIC injury severity scale. However, recall that our concern with the
validity of the lower categories of the scale and the number of cases
persuaded us to aggregate categories 1 through 4 in all of the tables
reporting our data.
The mean award for all cases was $4,383,367. The median was con-
siderably lower, $1,211,550. This discrepancy reflects a few very large
awards (see awards at the ninety-fifth percentile) that inflated the
mean. Consistent with other studies that have used the NAIC scale,
both mean and median awards increased with severity of injury except
when death occurred, the award was substantially lower.148 For in-
stance in category 8, grave injury, the median award was $9,644,460,
but the median award when death occurred was $1,076,441, almost
nine times smaller. Thus, on average, awards tracked seriousness of
injury. In the case of death, it is reasonable to hypothesize that
awards would be substantially smaller than in the case of grave inju-
ries because the economic costs of medical treatment for a grave in-
jury are likely to be greater and the pain and suffering would exist
over a longer time period.
TABLE 1
JURY AWARDS - NEW YORK: CATEGORIZED BY SEVERITY
OF INJURY
5 th 9 5 th Standard
Severity Level N Percentile Median Mean Percentile Deviation
4 or less 23 10,575 262,650 347,147 1,340,000 386,778
5 51 74,415 448,000 1,077,445 3,648,750 1,844,163
6 58 126,000 896,745 1,523,700 4,865,000 1,666,107
7 (perm.) 59 180,250 4,295,700 7,710,080 36,750,000 13,760,945
8 36 1,030,000 9,644,460 14,779,325 42,104,720 17,964,806
9 (death) 66 142,656 1,076,441 2,213,143 6,615,074 3,932,930
Total 293 104,250 1,211,550 4,383,367 17,712,500 10,115,209
Table 2 reports the mean and median awards for the 252 cases in
which the verdict reporter delineated the special and general damages
components of awards. Comparing the means and medians with the
full sample of 293 cases reported in Table 1, it may be seen that they
are not substantially different from those reported in Table 1. Table 2
148. See Viscusi, supra note 4; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4.
[Vol. 48:265
JURY AWARDS
gives us no grounds for inferring that the delineated cases differed
from the total sample even though we cannot rule out this possibility.
The last column in Table 2 reports the mean proportion of the total
award constituted by the general damages component and the stan-
dard deviations of those mean proportions (in parentheses). Consid-
ering all cases, the average general damages proportion of awards was
.58, that is 58%. However, the proportion varied as a function of the
physical seriousness of the injury. For cases involving grave injury
(category 8), on average 40% of the verdict involved general damages,
and in cases involving death, this component was 42%.
Note one additional finding in the last column. The standard devia-
tion of the proportion of the general damages component was .30 for
all cases, but it varied by category of injury seriousness. Standard de-
viations ranged from .18 (category 5) to .34 (category 9). The data do
not allow any explanation for the variability. One possibility is that it
is random, but it is equally possible that the awards reflect differences
in the severity of suffering or past and future length of suffering that
the jury estimated from the trial evidence. Just as Sloan and his co-
authors documented considerable variability in economic losses across
injured plaintiffs, 149 pain and suffering and other elements of general
damages may likewise vary.
Finally, we turn to the question of what happens to jury awards in
the immediate aftermath of the verdict. This analysis was conducted
on our larger sample of 293 cases that included both delineated and
non-delineated awards (i.e., those appearing in Table 1). The New
York Jury Verdict Reporter provided information on 112 of these
cases. Fifty-seven cases settled immediately after the verdict. Two
settled for the exact amount of the verdict and two settled for a
greater amount. Forty-six cases settled for a lesser amount. Seven
cases were listed as settled, but the amount was not reported. One
case was increased by additur and there were four j.n.o.v. judgments.
Twenty-three cases were reduced through remittitur, and seventeen
were adjusted downwards because of a jury finding that the plaintiff
bore responsibility for part of the loss under the comparative negli-
gence rule. The reason for a downward adjustment in award was not
reported for ten cases. In short, of the cases for which complete data
were available, three were adjusted upwards from the jury award, and
ninety-six were adjusted downward.
149. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 975.
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TABLE 2
DELINEATED JURY AWARDS - NEW YORK: CATEGORIZED BY
SEVERITY OF INJURY AND REPORTING PROPORTION DUE TO
GENERAL DAMAGES
Mean (SD)
Severity 5"' 95h' Standard Proportion
Level N Percentile Median Mean Percentile Deviation General Damages
4 or less 14 456 372,750 462,819 1,512,000 452,988 .72 (.29)
5 39 74,415 538,721 1,213,524 5,062,304 2,043,541 .82 (.18)
6 50 126,000 950,000 1,617,664 4,794,968 1,698,545 .69 (.21)
7 (perm.) 53 344,400 4,295,700 7,996,432 36,750,000 14,425,074 .56 (.26)
8 33 1,030,000 10,048,920 15,202,560 42,251,720 18,479,278 .40 (.22)
9 (death) 63 171,360 1,095,083 2,291,558 6,614,969 4,008,767 .42 (.34)
Total 252 107,468 1,338,350 4,779,975 18,047,000 10,716,761 .58 (.30)
We can now ask what the plaintiffs received in the immediate after-
math of the jury's verdict by recalculating the data to account for the
known adjustments. Table 3 reports the adjusted total awards for 286
cases. We see that the median adjusted award for all cases was
$892,125 compared to the median verdict award of $1,211,550 in Table
1. This $315,425 difference makes the median payment to plaintiffs
just 73% of the original jury award. Making the same comparison
with the arithmetic means shown in Tables 3 and 1, the figures are
$2,703,848 and $4,383,367. Thus, the mean payment to the plaintiff
was approximately 62% of the jury verdict. Additional analyses indi-
cated that of the fifty cases in the sample that had the lowest awards,
there were twelve reductions. In contrast of the fifty cases that had
the highest awards, twenty-five were adjusted downward. Moreover,
the largest downward changes involved the largest awards.
The figures reflected in Table 3 reflect substantial adjustments in
both mean and median jury awards. These are likely very conserva-
tive estimates for several reasons. We know that seven additional
cases were adjusted downwards, but we do not know the amounts.
Other cases were listed in the Reporter as being appealed by the de-
fendants. Some of these cases may have been adjusted downward by
the higher court or overturned, and others may have settled for a
lesser amount at a later point in the litigation process. However, lack-
ing data on the actual outcomes of this process, we will have to be
content with the known figures.
286 [Vol. 48:265
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TABLE 3
ACTUAL PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFF FOLLOWING JUDGMENT AND/OR
SETTLEMENT - NEW YORK: CATEGORIZED BY SEVERITY OF INJURY
5th 9 5th Standard
Severity Level N Percentile Median Mean Percentile Deviation
4 or less 23 5,816 247,406 246,598 566,500 181,904
5 50 74,415 420,800 806,598 3,159,450 938,154
6 58 49,000 585,226 1,150,350 3,829,350 1,444,914
7 (perm.) 56 180,250 2,476,675 4,908,655 13,315,531 7,784,406
8 33 1,030,000 5,805,000 8,339,447 30,037,000 8,643,278
9 (death) 66 69,825 597,520 1,674,124 6,218,213 3,390,892
Total 286* 73,500 892,125 2,703,848 10,520,300 5,455,654
* Seven cases contain no settlement information.
Some selected case examples involving large awards help visualiza-
tion of these statistics. Kaufman v. New York Infirmary'50 involved a
claim of failure to administer oxygen to a premature infant that re-
sulted in cerebral palsy, mental retardation (IQ of seventy) and spastic
quadriplegia.' 51 During a seven-week trial, a nurse testified that, de-
spite obvious signs of distress and a call for a pediatric resident, no
one appeared and oxygen was not given to the child until six hours
later.152 The jury awarded the plaintiff, age fourteen at trial,
$1,098,000 for future medical expenses, $5,720,000 for nursing care,
$2,897,375 for physical therapy and $1,400,000 for future lost earnings,
for a total of $11,115,375 of special damages.153 Additionally, the jury
awarded $14,000,000 for past pain and suffering and, based on a life
expectancy of another 62.5 years, a total of $65,200,000 for future pain
and suffering. 154 The total award of $90,315,375 settled for $7,000,000
in 1995 while post-trial motions were pending. 155 In short, the settle-
ment was only 63% of the $1 million special damage award and less
than 8% of the original jury verdict. 156
Whitaker v. NYCHHC157 involved a woman, age fifty-two at time of
the injury, who alleged that a misdiagnosis of a constriction of her
small intestine led to an infection that caused loss of all but two feet of
her intestines. 58 As a consequence, for three years she was fed
150. 13 N.Y. JURY VERDICT REP. 44-1 (Sup. Ct. York County No. 20026/87 1996).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Kaufman, 13 N.Y. JURY VERDICr REP., at 44-1.
157. 5 N.Y. JURY VERDicr REP. 12-34 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County No. 16491/83 1988).
158. Id.
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through a tube in her chest for eighteen hours each day.159 She
weaned herself from this regimen of parenteral nutrition, but required
a diet of extremely small meals.160 Medical evidence presented at trial
provided that parenteral nutrition would eventually be required
again.161 The plaintiff suffered from osteoporosis and anemia as a re-
sult of her inability to ingest calcium and vitamins.162 Experts pre-
dicted that within ten years her spinal column would collapse and she
would be confined to a wheelchair.1 63 Required antibiotics caused
middle ear damage.' 64 The plaintiff was in constant pain, suffered uri-
nary incontinence and was required to take an anti-diarrhea drug that
is a possible carcinogen.165 A medical malpractice panel decision in
favor of the plaintiff was placed in evidence.166 The total jury award
was $65,086,000 and included $58,000,000 for past and future pain and
suffering.' 67 The award was reduced as excessive.' 68 The judgment
gave only $1,000,000 for pain and suffering, and the total award
amounted to $3,200,000, less than 5% of the original jury verdict.' 69
Pietri v. North Central Bronx Hospital 70 involved misplacement of
an endotracheal tube in a twenty-four-year-old married building su-
perintendent and painter while he was being treated for a fractured
leg following an automobile accident. 17' Cerebral anoxia led to
profound brain damage reducing mental skills to level of a five-year-
old person.172 The plaintiff, who had spoken four languages, initially
had no memory of his wife and infant son.'7 3 Subsequently, his wife
separated from him.174 The plaintiff required lifelong institutional
care. 75 Defendants conceded liability, and at the end of an eight-day
trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff $24,517,518, including $20,000,000
for pain and suffering; his wife received $3,000,000 for loss of services;
$5,000,000 was awarded to the plaintiff's mother; and $1,000,000 was
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Whitaker, 5 N.Y. JURY VERDICT REP., at 12-34.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Whitaker, 5 N.Y. JURY VERDICT REP., at 12-34.
170. 6 N.Y. JURY VERDICr REP. 7-23 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County No. 6391/83 1989).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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awarded to his son. 176 The court set aside the awards for the mother
and son. 177 The plaintiff's award was reduced to $7,017,058, including
$2,500,000 for pain and suffering, and his wife's was reduced to $1
million.178 Thus, in judgment the jury's total verdict of $33,517,518
was reduced to $8,017,578, or about 24% of the original verdict. The
defendant gave notice of appeal of the judgment. 179
Ebert v. NYCHHC180 yielded a total jury award of $27 million. 18'
The plaintiff, age fifteen, was injured after falling from a pier. 8 2 The
hospital did not examine him for more than an hour, and his spine was
not immobilized until more than four hours after that.183 The plain-
tiff, age thirty-two at trial, was rendered a quadriplegic. 8 4 In a first
trial of the issues, a jury awarded the plaintiff $2,300,000.185 The
plaintiff moved to set the verdict aside, and the trial judge increased
the award to $4.3 million. 8 6 A second trial was ordered after the de-
fendant refused to pay.187 Following the second verdict, the judge re-
duced the $15 million award for past and future pain and suffering to
$5 million.'8 8 An award for custodial care was reduced from $12 mil-
lion to $6.4 million resulting in a final judgment of $11.4 million, or
about 42% of the original verdict.189
D'Alessio v. Methodist Hospital of Brooklyn' 90 involved negligence
in diagnosing renal failure in a two-month-old child, resulting in se-
vere brain damage.' 91 The jury determined that Methodist Hospital
was 65% negligent and the pediatrician was 35% negligent.192 The
plaintiff was awarded $26 million by the jury.193 The trial judge re-
duced the $6 million verdict for future pain and suffering to $2.5 mil-
lion, the $12 million for future custodial care to $2 million, and $8
176. Pietri, 6 N.Y. JURY VERDICr REP., at 7-23.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 7 N.Y. JURY VERDICT REP. 38-5 (Sup. Ct. Kings County No. 13075/77 1991).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Ebert, 7 N.Y. JURY VERDICT REP., at 38-5.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 8 N.Y. JURY VERDiCT REP. 46-8 (Sup. Ct. Kings County No. 31000/83 1990).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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million for future therapy to $500,000.194 The final judgment was $5
million, but Methodist Hospital was held liable for only 65% of the
amount.195 The pediatrician, found 35% liable, died bankrupt before
the trial began.196 The parties subsequently agreed to a structured set-
tlement with a present value of $4 million. 197 As a consequence, the
final amount paid to the plaintiff was just over 15 % of the original jury
verdict.
Adjustments also occur at the lower end of the award scale. Con-
sider a single example. In Berg v. Central General Hospital,198 a fifty-
two-year-old nurse's aid alleged negligent failure to diagnose an infec-
tion of her spinal fluid.199 She suffered a full seizure and brain infec-
tion and required daily treatment with anti-seizure medication. 200 The
jury awarded $350,000 for pain and suffering. 201 The case settled for
$212,500 while post-trial motions were pending. 202
B. Florida
Like New York, Florida law requires juries to render a verdict that
specifies the individual amounts of special and general damages. 20 3
1. The Sample
The data base for Florida was the Florida Jury Verdict Reporter that
is archived in Westlaw. This data base is neither a random nor a com-
prehensive sample. Judges and their clerks throughout Florida select
their most interesting or notable cases and forward them to Westlaw.
We do not know what percent of total trial verdicts these cases repre-
sent. We gathered verdicts from trials decided for the years 1987
through 1996.
There were 525 cases in the sample. Plaintiff verdicts occurred in
233 of them, a win rate of 44%. Like the New York sample, this win
rate is considerably higher than the nationwide win rate of 30% for
malpractice cases. In addition to the possibilities that litigation pat-
terns are different in Florida or that juries are more favorable to de-
fendants in malpractice cases, the discrepancy may also be explained
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. D'Alessio, 8 N.Y. JURY VERDICT REP., at 46-8.
197. Id.
198. 10 N.Y. JURY VERDICT REP. 27-1 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County No. 13788/83 1993).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.042 (West 1997).
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by the discretion judges have in reporting cases. It seems plausible
that judges are more likely to report plaintiff wins than losses because
wins are associated with damage awards, and thus the sample over
represents plaintiff wins. However, the fact is that we just cannot de-
termine the cause or causes. Nevertheless, within the sample we can
still conduct the same analyses as in New York.
Missing, incomplete, or ambiguous data reduced the initial sample
to 210 cases. There were many cases for which the records reported
only the total award rather than its component parts. As a conse-
quence, the delineated sample involved just 113 cases. All the awards
and settlements were adjusted to reflect 1995 dollars. The coding
scheme for severity of injury was the same as used for the New York
data.
2. Jury Verdicts, Judgments and Settlements
Table 4 reports the total awards for all of the cases. The mean of all
verdicts was $1,250,135, and the median was $390,300. These figures
are substantially lower than those in New York, but, interestingly, the
medians are very close to median malpractice awards reported by Ste-
phen Daniels and Joanne Martin in statistics derived from Los Ange-
les, St. Louis, Cook County, Illinois, and Dallas.20 4 The amount of
these awards, like in New York, was positively related to severity of
injury assessed on the truncated NAIC scale.
TABLE 4
JURY AWARDS - FLORIDA: CATEGORIZED BY SEVERITY OF INJURY
5 th 95"
h  Standard
Severity Level N Percentile Median Mean Percentile Deviation
4 & below 19 22,400 238,350 361,232 2,781,000 612,970
5 53 14,040 193,500 417,031 1,638,000 615,137
6 67 47,040 361,200 629,637 2,010,000 785,964
7 (perm.) 18 52,650 1,776,885 3,669,038 14,625,000 4,450,512
8 14 135,000 5,458,353 5,502,310 12,300,000 4,006,147
9 (death) 39 157,500 774,000 1,238,505 4,068,970 1,198,156
Total 210 35,020 390,300 1,250,135 6,328,350 2,297,466
Table 5 reports the delineated awards. The differences between the
total awards reported in Table 5 and those reported in Table 4 reflect
substantial attrition in the sample (it is only 54% of the total award
data set). The median in Table 5 is a little higher than Table 4, but the
mean is a little lower. The delineated sample could be unrepresenta-
tive of the total award sample, but it appears to be similar. The last
204. DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 84-86.
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column of Table 5 shows that the proportion of the award for general
damages averaged at .54, that is 54%. This is roughly similar to the
58% figure for New York. The standard deviation of the proportion,
that is .34, is similar to New York as well.
Next, consider the post-trial adjustments in Florida. Of the 210
cases reported in Table 4, the data indicated that fifty-eight were ad-
justed in the immediate aftermath of the jury's verdict. One case was
set aside entirely with a j.n.o.v., one was settled for an undisclosed
amount, one settled for a smaller amount, and two settled for a larger
amount than the jury's award. Of the remaining cases, forty-one were
adjusted downwards because the jury found that the plaintiff had con-
tributed to the loss, three were adjusted by remittitur, and three were
adjusted by subtracting the amount of a prior payment to the plaintiff.
Data on why adjustments made were missing for six cases.
TABLE 5
DELINEATED JURY AWARDS - FLORIDA: CATEGORIZED BY
SEVERITY OF INJURY AND REPORTING PROPORTION DUE TO
GENERAL DAMAGES
Mean (SD)
Severity 5th  95"' Standard Proportion
Level N Percentile Median Mean Percentile Deviation General Damages
4 & below 11 41,965 239,208 478,642 2,781,000 787,063 .42 (.40)
5 30 34,949 202,300 471,135 1,785,000 696,960 .48 (.34)
6 31 47,040 386,250 630,809 2,022,920 853,621 .58 (.32)
7 (perm.) 9 139,085 2,229,734 4,220,203 14,625,000 4,610,484 .54 (.32)
8 10 135,000 3,797,913 4,529,225 10,105,024 3,402,489 .49 (.34)
9 (death) 22 291,200 943,335 1,421,703 3,492,540 1,322,939 .63 (.33)
Total 113 43,260 451,136 1,358,457 6,328,350 2,267,828 .54 (.34)
Table 6 reports the means, medians, and other statistics that take
into account the known adjustments to jury verdicts. Comparing the
median adjusted award of $361,200 to the unadjusted award of
$390,300 in Table 4, we see that it is about 7% lower. Comparing the
mean of $1,147,235 to the mean of $1,250,135 in Table 4, we see that
the difference is about 8% lower. Thus, compared to New York, the
data suggest that post-verdict adjustments are substantially smaller in
Florida. However, the initial awards in Florida were substantially
smaller than in New York. We will return to this issue in our
conclusions.
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TABLE 6
ACTUAL PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFF FOLLOWING JUDGMENT AND/OR
SETTLEMENT - FLORIDA: CATEGORIZED BY SEVERITY OF INJURY
5t  95"t  Standard
Severity Level N Percentile Median Mean Percentile Deviation
4 & below 19 8,652 113,230 317,378 2,781,000 615,241
5 52 7,605 193,430 369,835 1,638,000 598,354
6 67 9,675 290,250 521,320 1,574,500 678,208
7 (perm.) 18 52,650 1,752,285 3,558,409 14,625,000 4,343,728
8 14 71,550 3,797,913 5,074,917 11,657,802 3,973,181
9 (death) 39 69,188 731,360 1,140,564 4,068,970 1,174,528
Total 209* 12,300 361,200 1,147,235 6,037,806 2,220,112
*n = 1 case missing on settlement information.
C. California
California law requires itemized verdicts separating special and gen-
eral awards.20 5 Additionally, the law places a $250,000 cap on general
damages in lawsuits against a healthcare provider.20 6
1. The Sample
The California data were taken from the California Jury Verdict Re-
porter catalogued in Westlaw. The cases encompassed the period
from 1991 through 1997.
There were 916 cases in the initial sample and plaintiffs prevailed in
206, a win rate of 22.5%. This figure is lower than the national aver-
age of 30%. It is also much lower than the win rates in the New York
and Florida samples. The differences may be due to litigation pat-
terns, representativeness of data collection, or jury behavior.
The initial data set involving jury awards consisted of 203 cases
(three cases were lost due to incomplete data). Because of various
types of missing data, the sample for total awards was reduced to 179
cases. Further attrition of the sample resulted when we attempted to
analyze the pain and suffering component; missing data and other re-
porting problems reduced the sample to just ninety-two cases.
2. Jury Verdicts, Judgments and Settlements
Table 7 reports the statistics for all awards. The mean award for all
cases was $1,720,279, and the median was $344,250. The pattern of
awards in relation to seriousness of injury is generally similar to that
205. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 425.10 (West Supp. 1998).
206. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997).
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found in New York and Florida, namely awards increased with injury
seriousness but were substantially lower when death occurred.
TABLE 7
JURY AWARDS - CALIFORNIA: CATEGORIZED BY SEVERITY
OF INJURY
5 t
h  
95th Standard
Severity Level N Percentile Median Mean Percentile Deviation
4 & below 39 7,350 137,250 539,124 1,862,000 1,216,131
5 39 10,900 152,492 389,790 1,660,960 719,743
6 35 46,598 455,260 646,397 1,813,000 650,885
7 (perm.) 11 884,450 7,985,174 14,522,142 55,094,700 17,162,831
8 15 202,035 2,920,000 4,140,161 26,053,000 6,380,585
9 (death) 40 80,088 391,300 680,812 2,133,000 630,109
Total 179 19,620 344,250 1,720,279 6,300,000 5,668,264
Table 8 reports the data for the delineated awards. The means and
the medians are slightly higher than in the full working sample. The
last column of Table 8 reports the percentage of the award that is for
general damages and the standard deviations of those portions. For
all cases the proportion is .60, but this proportion varies substantially
according to seriousness of injury.
Forty-five, or 25%, of the 179 jury verdicts in the initial sample were
reported as having been subject to post-verdict adjustments. Two of
the cases settled for a higher amount, and two were settled for a lower
amount, and one case was increased through additur. One verdict was
set entirely aside by a j.n.o.v., and eight cases had portions of the
award set aside by the judge because of a payment to the plaintiff
from another source. Twelve cases were adjusted downward for com-
parative negligence because the jury found the plaintiff to have con-
tributed to the injury. Reasons for a downward adjustment were not
reported for another two cases. Finally, twenty-four awards were ad-
justed downward because of statutory caps on general damages.
Seven of these twenty-four include cases that were also adjusted
downward because of the jury's verdict that the plaintiff's negligence
contributed to the injury.
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TABLE 8
DELINEATED JURY AWARDS - CALIFORNIA: CATEGORIZED BY
SEVERITY OF INJURY AND REPORTING PROPORTION DUE TO
GENERAL DAMAGES
Mean (SD)
Severity 5th 95 h  Standard Proportion
Level N Percentile Median Mean Percentile Deviation General Damages
4 & below 19 7,350 307,800 335,661 1,580,500 355,056 .62 (.33)
5 19 5,775 210,000 593,664 4,125,780 966,340 .68 (.28)
6 23 54,500 455,260 744,782 1,813,000 735,168 .59 (.25)
7 (perm.) 7 884,450 6,300,000 15,102,724 55,094,700 20,338,137 .30 (.25)
8 10 202,035 3,262,500 2,855,381 5,921,053 2,165,175 .35 (.35)
9 (death) 14 190,241 350,000 668,028 1,851,000 632,692 .77 (.22)
Total 92 48,341 407,873 1,939,266 5,921,053 6,563,498 .60(.31)
Table 9 reports the outcomes in the aftermath of the verdict. The
median award for all cases was $307,800 compared to the median of
$344,250 for unadjusted awards reported in Table 7, a reduction of
about 11%. The mean award was $1,542,449 compared to the original
average verdict of $1,720,279; this is a reduction of approximately
10%.
TABLE 9
ACTUAL PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFF FOLLOWING JUDGMENT AND/OR
SETTLEMENT - CALIFORNIA: CATEGORIZED BY SEVERITY
OF INJURY
5tb  95"b  Standard
Severity Level N Percentile Median Mean Percentile Deviation
4 & below 39 4,663 137,250 498,353 1,862,000 1,211,234
5 39 10,900 147,000 261,893 1,293,600 338,251
6 35 15,000 400,000 583,082 1,813,000 614,527
7 (perm.) 11 635,470 6,300,000 13,129,967 55,094,700 17,526,568
8 15 202,035 1,545,000 3,882,063 26,053,000 6,457,314
9 (death) 40 80,088 332,150 584,507 2,106,650 577,260
Total 179 15,000 307,800 1,542,449 5,921,053 5,546,518
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Cross-jurisdiction comparisons of the data reported in this article
must be approached with extreme caution because of differences in
laws, litigation patterns, legal cultures, and methodological differences
in the compilation of data sets. Nevertheless, there are common
threads in the findings. The threads appear despite the "noise" gener-
ated by the many differences.
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Following the findings of previous studies, there is a consistent rela-
tionship between the amount of verdict awards and the seriousness of
injury suffered by the plaintiff. Awards increased with injury severity,
except that there was a sharp decrease when death occurred.
In all three states, the percentage of the total, unadjusted damage
awards exceeded 50%, on average, for all cases: 58% in New York,
54% in Florida, and 60% in California. These figures are consistent
with the conclusions of other studies that utilized weaker methodolo-
gies.207 Considering this study in conjunction with the other studies, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the general damages portion of
jury awards in malpractice cases is, on average, between 50 and 60%.
Although our results mirror those of other studies, which estimate
that general damages constitute approximately half of total jury
awards, we are not prepared to conclude that the magnitude of these
amounts stems from jury caprice or unwarranted sympathy. First, as
we have noted, verdict report data cannot provide information on the
basis behind the jury's decision-making process. Second, the label
"pain and suffering" may be misleading because general damages en-
compass other elements, some of which even provide the jury discre-
tion to consider economic consequences. At trial and in closing
arguments, these elements are presented to the jury. Unfortunately,
the verdict reporters seldom report these factors as separate elements,
and simply classify everything under the label "pain and suffering." In
New York, for example, 231 cases listed only the category of pain and
suffering, although seventeen cases specifically listed "loss of parental
guidance," or "loss of moral training," and two listed "emotional dis-
tress." In Florida, the reports predominantly listed pain and suffering
but there were also some specific listings for "loss of companionship,"
"loss of consortium," emotional distress," "disfigurement," "mental
anguish," "loss of enjoyment of life," and "human damages." In Cali-
fornia, the listings were primarily "general damages," and "non-eco-
nomic damages," with some specific listings of "pain and suffering."
There were a few cases that listed "loss of consortium" and "emo-
tional distress." Absent information regarding whether juries seldom
gave awards for these other elements of general damages or whether
the elements were simply categorized as "pain and suffering" by the
compilers of the data, we cannot go further with our analysis. Verdict
reports are inadequate sources to study the reasoning behind jury de-
cisions on general damage awards. The issues related to general dam-
ages will have to be investigated by jury interviews or other methods.
207. See supra Part I.
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Wrongful death cases from the New York data set provide addi-
tional instructive insight about general damages, however. In New
York, the proportion of the awards due to general damages compo-
nents was smaller in cases of wrongful death than in cases where the
patient survived, but it was still large, namely 42% of the total award.
The New York pattern jury instructions for "wrongful death and con-
scious pain" distinguishes between pecuniary losses and any conscious
pain and suffering that the decedent suffered between injury and
death.20 Jurors are instructed that they may not consider or make
any award for "sorrow, mental anguish, or injury to feeling or loss of
companionship. '20 9 In deciding these losses, however, the jurors are
instructed that a child's pecuniary loss also includes damages from the
deprivation of the "intellectual, moral and physical training and edu-
cation which the parent would have given.1210 While distinguishing
pecuniary losses, the instructions follow the phrase "wrongful death
and conscious pain" with an immediate admonishment that the jurors
should consider a sum that will "fairly and justly compensate for the
pain and suffering actually endured by decedent during such time as
he was conscious from the moment he was injured to the moment of
his death. '211 The next sentence to this instruction does not even
pause for a new paragraph before instructing the jury that the estate
can also recover reasonable expenses for medical aid, nursing, and
loss of earnings from the date of the decedent's injury to death.2 12
Fine legal distinctions aside, the New York pattern instructions on
wrongful death functionally merge pecuniary and non-pecuniary
losses, so that even if the jury is required to state separate amounts for
special and general damages, it is unlikely that they are considered as
separate elements. At least in some cases, delineation of damages is
not required. In McNair v. Rubin,213 a twenty-four-year-old unmar-
ried, unemployed woman with two children, ages five and three, died
from complications of an abortion.214 The abortion attempt caused
violent contractions, causing the woman to lapse into a coma, and she
died a week later.21 5 The trial judge refused to charge the jury sepa-
rately on loss of earnings and pain and suffering.2 16 The jury returned
208. NEw YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Civil 2-320 (West Supp. 1996).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 5 N.Y. JURY VERDIcr REP. 2-3 (Sup. Ct. Manhattan County No. 4492/81 1986).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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a verdict of defendant negligence and awarded $700,000 for wrongful
death plus $1,500 for funeral expenses.217
The lesson from the wrongful death statute analysis shows that even
formal legal instructions merge pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses.
The analysis also demonstrates that some pecuniary losses are not cal-
culable by strict accounting methods and require instead an important
degree of human judgment. Taken alongside the conceptual criticism
that it is inappropriate to label all general damages as "pain and suf-
fering," this study provides information bearing on both the norma-
tive and empirical interpretation of jury awards for general damages.
In our view, however, the most important contribution of this re-
search is the clear demonstration that the preoccupation with jury ver-
dicts by researchers, and by legislators and the general public, is
misleading. While we are not the first researchers to investigate post-
verdict adjustments, this article clearly shows that the institution of
the civil jury is embedded in a broader system of checks and balances
and that these checks and balances operate on a regular basis to miti-
gate outlier verdicts and may even reduce verdicts.218 In New York,
the data showed, approximately 44% of jury awards were adjusted
downward in the immediate period following the verdict and that the
eventual payments to plaintiffs were, on average, 62% of the awards.
Without question this is a very conservative estimate since the verdict
reporters only cover a short time period following the verdict. A good
number of the cases with mega-awards are included in the post-trial
adjustment calculations and heavily inflate the statistical mean, but it
is likely that many of these eventually resulted in much lower actual
payments to plaintiffs. Recall that in some of the cases that we se-
lected for closer analysis, some of the mega-awards actually produced
payouts to plaintiffs that were less than 10% of the original jury ver-
dict. Moreover, while some reductions were made against special
damages, the vast bulk of the reductions were explicitly or implicitly
tallied against general damage awards.
The reductions in average awards were less dramatic in Florida and
California, but the awards themselves were substantially lower than in
New York. One reasonable interpretation of these differences is that
217. Id.
218. Indeed, even awards that correspond to evidence on special damages may be reduced
through settlement in order to avoid the delay and risks of appeals court ruling.
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there was less reason for the remedial checks and balances to be ap-
plied in the former jurisdictions. 219
In concluding, we emphasize again that, absent independent crite-
ria, jury awards alone tell us almost nothing about the fairness and
justness of verdicts. We do observe, however, that the number of out-
lier verdicts were few in relation to the jury awards that appeared to
fall within arguably reasonable ranges, at least from the perspective of
the apparent gravity of injuries suffered by plaintiffs. At minimum,
our research calls for more careful thought and consideration about
the interpretation and evaluation of statistics about jury awards.
This research also bears on public and legislative images of the tort
system. The mass media have been shown to paint a distorted picture
of the tort system through the selective reporting of mega awards in
medical malpractice cases and other torts. 220 Smaller awards and
cases in which defendants prevail (the majority of cases in most mal-
practice trials) do not receive coverage. Additionally, the media often
do not report accurately on the type of evidence that the jury heard at
trial. Finally, even though the final judgment or settlement in the case
frequently occurs within days of the jury verdict, it is stale news unde-
serving of further coverage. The research in this article indicates that
there is a substantial gap between jury awards, and the amounts that
plaintiffs (and their lawyers) receive in the aftermath of jury verdicts.
Policy discussions about the civil jury system and its financial conse-
quences for plaintiffs and for defendants and their insurers need to
consider this gap. There appear to be corrective forces in the litiga-
tion system that operate on outlier awards.
219. Another explanation, of course, is that the Florida and California reports were less rigor-
ous in reporting post-trial adjustments. Still another is that these states are more conservative in
making such adjustments.
220. See Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as
Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
419, 420 (1996); Chase, supra note 4, at 77; Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased
Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENY. U. L. REv. 77, 77 (1993).
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